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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Industrial Policy Incentives in Ireland 
Industrial development policy in Ireland has long been characterised by its 
reliance on both discretionary and non-discretionary incentives. The former 
includes a range of grants for new investment or expansion projects in 
manufacturing and certain internationally traded service sectors. The latter 
features a low rate of corporation profits tax rate applicable (up to now) to 
essentially the same sectors (though the profits tax rate will soon be unified at a 
low rate for all sectors). Although, like its predecessor export sales relief, the 
regime does not discriminate between foreign-owned and indigenous firms, it 
was probably always envisaged chiefly as a mechanism for inducing an inflow 
of foreign direct investment. The low tax rate, combined with international tax 
treaties, is of great advantage to US and other firms with unsheltered foreign 
tax liabilities; the discretionary grants enable the Irish development agencies to 
compete with other possible destinations for internationally mobile investment 
projects. The success of the policy is evidenced by the remarkably high share of 
foreign-owned companies in manufacturing whether measured by employment 
(45 per cent) or output (70 per cent). 
While the benefits of the tax and grant regime are thus evident, there have 
also been costs. Use of public funds for this policy imposes a tax burden on the 
rest of the economy which could be very damaging (cf. O’Rourke, 1994). It 
also potentially damages the rest of the economy by bidding-up the price of 
labour and other resources (cf. Barry and Hannan, 1995). Indeed, unless 
supported by other policies, rapid industrial expansion can also entail a variety 
of external congestion costs which are only recently becoming evident. As the 
Culliton report (1992) argued, the discretionary element of the grants can 
encourage rent-seeking that may distract local entrepreneurs from productive 
activity. 
Evaluation of Applications for Grant-aid 
Taking as given both the discretionary policy and the existence of grants, 
the Irish industrial development agencies still need a system of ex ante 
evaluation of specific applications for grant assistance. The Economic and 
Social Research Institute recently carried out a review of the evaluation model 
which had been in use by the agencies since the late 1970s and which was 
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based on economic cost-benefit methodology.1 Although specifically tailored 
to the needs of the agencies, several key elements of our approach have a wider 
application, as they address some important though oft-neglected issues in cost-
benefit work in Ireland more generally. 
We started from the position that the evaluation model is essentially a 
management information system designed to improve decision-making in 
regard to grant approvals. As such, the model should be based on the policy-
maker’s understanding of the economic distortions to which policy is 
addressed, and employ a credible quantification of these distortions. It should, 
when employed, result in satisfactory policy decisions which are not 
themselves distorting.  
Interest in cost-benefit analysis was at its strongest in the 1970s, when 
economic policies perpetuated distortions, and when (in an era before 
privatisation) policy-makers looked extensively to semi-autonomous state 
agencies to target public funds to social goals. Chapter 2 reviews the 
fluctuating fortunes of cost-benefit, and provides a general introduction to the 
present application. 
The Major Issues  
This paper isolates three main issues in cost-benefit that stand out from the 
study of industrial development grants as having a wider application and being 
of general interest. First is the need to take better account of system effects in 
arriving at the appropriate treatment of labour costs (shadow wage). Second is 
the importance of measuring and valuing the tax and government expenditure 
flows involved in such incentive schemes. Third, account needs to be taken of 
deadweight: the fact that (despite the best efforts of the agencies) some grants 
will be higher than necessary to secure the project. Chapter 3 sets out the basic 
cost-benefit formula and shows precisely where the assumptions about shadow 
wage, about the net cost of tax revenue forgone and about the burden of 
deadweight enter. Each of these three elements is discussed in the following 
three chapters. 
There are other considerations one could bring into the analysis – 
environmental issues, congestion, technology spin-offs. But increasing 
elaboration into uncharted territory could weaken rather than strengthen the 
practical usefulness of a formal evaluation scheme. When the decision-makers 
know which factors have been quantified, they can make their own allowance 
for the rest. 
Shadow Wage 
Despite high unemployment in Ireland, a shadow wage as low as 15 per 
cent of market wage (i.e., ignoring 85 per cent of the project’s wage costs in 
making the evaluation) cannot be defended. Employment creation policy is not 
 
1 The review was carried out by the author and Eoin O’Malley, with a contribution 
by Philip O'Connell and the assistance of Jane Kelly, Siobhan Kenny and Alan Wall. 
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as effective in reducing employment as is often believed. The well-documented 
rapid and substantial migration responses to changes in the difference between 
Irish and UK unemployment levels confirm this. The fact that unemployment is 
falling now reflects low unemployment in the UK as well as the strong job 
growth at home. It is primarily because of this linkage that we argue that the 
shadow wage used for this kind of job creation measure should be much higher 
than it has been. Chapter 4 spells out the analysis leading to the 
recommendation to use a shadow wage of about 80 per cent. 
Tax Revenue and the Shadow-price of Public Funds 
While the treatment of tax revenues in appraisal can be controversial, the 
position here (presented in Chapter 5) is clear. Indeed, in contrast to 
conventional project appraisal, where the major costs are in terms of economic 
resources, the question of industrial policy is centrally focused on grant and tax 
costs. Not only must tax revenue be included in the calculation, but account 
must be taken of the fact that making up for lost tax revenues or the cash cost 
of grants imposes costs on the economy more than pound-for-pound. The latter 
consideration is taken account of by applying a premium factor (called the 
shadow-price of public funds) to all government revenues and expenditures.2 
This factor is estimated to be about 1.5 in Ireland at present, down from over 2 
in the mid-1980s (Honohan and Irvine, 1990). Because projects differ in their 
labour and tax intensity, including tax revenue in the calculation can alter the 
ranking of projects. 
Deadweight in Grant Assistance 
What about the investments that would have gone ahead anyway without 
the inducement of special taxes or grants? Some account must be taken of this 
deadweight. Of course the agencies do their best to strike a hard bargain, but so 
do the investors. Knowing that some grants will be unnecessarily generous, but 
not knowing which ones, implies that the cut-off for grants, the maximum that 
can be offered, should be lowered. This is quantitatively an important point, 
and it is not one for which the literature provides a ready answer. Our approach 
(Chapter 6) has been to develop a simple theory based on modern bargaining 
theory (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990), together with empirical estimates3 
of the degree to which manufacturing activity in Ireland is grant-sensitive (the 
aggregate elasticity of manufacturing activity with respect to the rate of grant), 
to arrive at an estimate of the allowance that needs to be made for deadweight. 
Quantification here is somewhat tentative (we suggest 80 per cent deadweight), 
but the logic of the approach is clear and has a wider applicability. 
 
 
2 The fact that government can freely borrow on international capital markets does 
not alter this: the debt will ultimately have to be serviced out of tax revenue. 
3 In practice we have inferred this from estimates of elasticity of demand for labour 
in manufacturing (cf. Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 1993). 
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Chapter 2 
THE FALL AND RISE OF COST-BENEFIT 
Following something of a lull in the early to mid-1980s, there has been a 
very substantial recovery in academic interest in issues of cost-benefit analysis. 
The reasons for this evolution are informative and help pinpoint what was less 
useful about previous work and what is likely to be fruitful in the future. 
The late 1970s and early 1980s trend towards the substitution of structural 
reform policies in preference to selective intervention by governments lies at 
the root of the decline in cost-benefit analysis around that time. 
2.1 Role of Cost-benefit Analysis  
Fundamentally, cost-benefit is designed to take account of market failures, 
i.e., of situations where market prices do not correspond to social value.4 If 
there were no market failure, then optimising behaviour by profit-seeking 
enterprises and by individuals in households should result in a socially optimal 
outcome – no involuntary unemployment, no missed opportunities to get the 
most out of national economic resources, no unwarranted environmental 
degradation. But in the presence of market failure the prices prevailing in the 
market-place do not provide the signals and incentives that will lead to a good 
outcome. All of the major classical sources of market failure are relevant to the 
industrial policy problem: 
 Externalities: for example, where my behaviour affects your opportunities, 
resulting in spillover costs or benefits not borne by me. If I am not taking 
account (internalising) certain of the costs or benefits of my actions, I will 
tend to consume or produce what, from Society’s point of view is too 
much, or too little (in the sense that others would be willing to subsidise me 
to produce more or consume less). The relevance to industrial or R&D 
linkages will be evident. 
 
4 There is only a relatively small published literature on Irish cost-benefit, despite 
many unpublished studies. Gray’s (1995) review of standard methodology contains 
some Irish case studies and references. Boyle (1993) describes the wider process of 
policy evaluation in an Irish context. There are many textbooks on cost-benefit 
analysis: a good recent one is Zerbe and Dively (1994). Drèze and Stern (1987) and 
Squire (1989) are fairly recent surveys at a more technical level. Layard and Glaister’s 
(1994) updated book of readings surveys some of the unresolved or disputed issues. 
Finally, Department of Finance (1994) and HM Treasury (1991) are official appraisal 
manuals. 
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Absence of relevant property rights: for example, if nobody owns the 
watercourses or the seafront, then I can degrade the water quality by 
discharging waste without cost; whereas if the watercourse had an owner, 
she would likely impose a fee that would induce me to curtail my 
discharges. This kind of situation is increasingly relevant in terms of the 
location decisions for heavy and other industry. 
 Monopoly power: for example, I have so much influence over the price I 
can charge that I will restrict output though marginal cost is below price. 
This can be potentially relevant in the labour market, where centralised 
pricing decisions may contribute to unemployment. 
 Taxation: it is not possible for the Government to raise enough revenue to 
meet various essential functions that it performs without introducing 
distortions to economic behaviour. Its high tax burden is a feature which 
Ireland shares with most modern industrial economies, and the distorting 
effects of taxation are so often perceived as a major source of economic 
inefficiency that they cannot be neglected in any list of market failures. 
Since market-driven choices may lead to socially inferior outcomes, the 
cost-benefit analyst attempts to construct a set of “as if” or shadow prices, 
which represent the prices which, if they prevailed in the market, would lead 
enterprises and individuals to make economic choices that correspond to the 
optimal welfare of all.5 The use of these shadow prices to guide public 
investment policy, the policy of state enterprises, and other public interventions 
is the goal of cost-benefit. By arranging that the public sector, in its direct 
economic interventions, behaves as if the shadow prices were in effect, the 
hope is that the economy as a whole will move closer to the optimum.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 A large branch of cost-benefit analysis also considers the distribution of resources 
between individuals as a potential source of deviation from the social optimum. This 
branch recognises that, even if the economy were producing at maximum efficiency, 
the optimum might not have been achieved if welfare is unevenly distributed among 
members of society. Our approach will, for the most part, assume that the problem of 
distribution is addressed somewhere else in the policy structure, and must be taken as 
given by those involved in industrial policy. 
6 One important issue here is that if certain segments of the economy are using 
shadow prices, while other parts of the economy are still responding to market prices, 
the outcome could be worse than if all were responding to market prices. More 
sophisticated applications make sure that these general equilibrium considerations are 
taken into account in computing shadow prices for guiding public sector decisions. 
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2.2 Reasons for the Decline in the Use of Cost-benefit 
Decline in the use of cost-benefit analysis in the 1970s may be traced to a 
wider disillusionment with piecemeal state intervention.7 Why limit oneself to 
making allowance for market failure in deciding the behaviour of state 
enterprises and state agencies if the sources of market failure could themselves 
be eliminated? This was the theme of the structural reform and structural 
adjustment movements, which were popularly manifested in Thatcherism and 
Reaganomics, but have actually guided economic policy initiatives since the 
late 1970s in most countries in the world, to a greater or lesser extent. 
These movements were also informed by an abandonment of the 
assumption that publicly-owned agencies or enterprises would always pursue 
social goals in a single-minded fashion. Once the relevance of this classic 
problem of principle and agent was recognised, the technocratic approach of 
cost-benefit lost some of its attraction. 
This is not the place to adjudicate on the success of the attempt to eliminate 
monopolies, increase competition and lower tax distortions. It is certainly the 
case that freer trade, the progressive completion of the single market in Europe, 
and the weakening of trade union power, have lowered the importance of many 
of the distortions to which cost-benefit solutions had been addressed. 
 For example, with free trade and elimination of foreign exchange controls, 
the notion of a shadow price of foreign exchange – once all-important in 
applications to developing countries, and also sometimes used for Ireland 
in the past – has lost all relevance. 
 The development of the international capital market as the residual source 
of borrowed funds, together with the removal of capital controls, has meant 
that the world interest rate has largely displaced shadow discount rates 
based on national rates of time preference or intertemporal substitution.  
 Despite the higher levels of unemployment which have prevailed since the 
mid-1970s and, as will be examined below in greater detail, even the 
shadow price of labour has been set close to or at the market wage in the 
cost-benefit practice of several industrial countries. 
2.3 The Come-back 
But cost-benefit has made a come-back. Why? Part of the reason is nothing 
more than a reaction to its comparative neglect in the mid 1980s. Not 
everything can be solved by structural adjustment, and Government inevitably 
remains heavily involved in influencing economic activity. The continuing role 
for Government and its agencies in project development and large-scale 
 
7 In addition, certain self-serving applications of cost-benefit analysis helped 
discredit the technique in some quarters. The fact that choosing shadow-prices is by no 
means an exact science provided scope for the manipulation of cost-benefit techniques 
to become a potential source of distortion itself. 
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physical planning means a continuing need for consistent methods of 
evaluation which are not merely based on financial profitability. Thus issues of 
transport congestion and the value of time, safety regulation and the value of a 
life, and such like, continue to require a cost-benefit type approach. The more 
obvious reason for the return to cost-benefit is the increasing public awareness 
of environmental issues which have not found satisfactory market solutions, 
and which inherently call for public policy intervention.8 In particular it is 
increasingly private sector investment projects that are now being subjected to 
cost-benefit analysis, whereas in the past it was mostly public sector projects.9 
If the shadow price can be worked out analytically, would it not be best for 
public policy to attempt to push market prices in the direction of the shadow 
prices, for example, through taxation? This is the approach advocated in many 
environmental contexts, and it has much to recommend it. This solution does 
require a decision to be taken at the highest levels of government. In the 
context of a free-trade area such as the European Union, it may require supra-
national authority, or at least a co-operative international arrangement. Indeed, 
a world solution may be required for some large policies such as that relating to 
CO2 emissions. It is the consideration that a higher layer of government may be 
required to achieve the best solution (equalising the shadow and market prices) 
that ensures a continued role for traditional cost-benefit interventions, i.e., 
public bodies acting on the basis of shadow prices which differ from market 
prices. 
2.4  Layers of Government and System-wide Impact 
Theoreticians have made significant progress in advancing our 
understanding of how to analyse the economy-wide impact of a cost-benefit 
procedure.10 This so-called “general equilibrium” approach will prove to be an 
essential component of our approach in this paper. 
An important element of recent theoretical work has been designed to 
clarify the appropriate behaviour of distinct layers of government which have 
different instruments at their disposal. Although the full optimum may not be 
attainable, it is important, in determining the optimal behaviour of a particular 
 
8 The cutting-edge of applied cost-benefit analysis at present is in the evaluation of 
unmarketable environmental goods, such as clean air and water, biological diversity 
(e.g., preservation of wetlands) and future climate risk. Attempting to determine the 
social value of this kind of thing by survey techniques, asking a representative sample 
of people what value they place on it (“contingent valuation”), raises conceptual and 
practical problems which are very hotly debated at present(cf. the debate between 
Diamond and Hausman, 1994, Hanemann, 1994 and Portney, 1994). This area is likely 
to become increasingly important in industrial policy in Ireland in the future. 
9 The present application is a hybrid: analysis of public grant policy directed towards 
influencing private investment decisions – though we do not explicitly cover the 
environmental issues in this paper. 
10 Notably in Drèze and Stern (1987, 1990), Hoehn and Randall (1989). 
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layer of government, to decide in advance what externalities it should take into 
account in deciding its actions, and what externalities it should leave 
uncorrected as being the appropriate responsibility of another layer.  
2.5 The Need for Operational Simplicity 
Although the pendulum of political economy, and the emergence of 
environmental awareness, have been the main driving forces in the cycle of 
interest in cost-benefit in recent decades, there is another, more practical factor, 
which has proved to be important, namely the need for simplicity. Project 
appraisal techniques which had heavy data requirements, and required elaborate 
and opaque calculations to produce answers – many of which lacked intuitive 
appeal – were never likely to catch-on in practice. Reappraisal by some of the 
authors of the most widely used cost-benefit manuals has pointed towards the 
need for a drastic simplification of cost-benefit procedures if they are to be 
applied in routine situations (such as arise with the industrial development 
agencies).11 This message must be taken seriously in the overhaul of industrial 
policy appraisal procedures. 
 
11 Cf. Little and Mirrlees (1991). 
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Chapter 3 
EVALUATION OF APPLICATIONS FOR GRANT-AID: THE BASIC 
FORMULA 
The formal cost-benefit appraisal system operated up to now by the 
industrial development agencies has been based on a standard criterion function 
which expresses the discounted present value of the project benefits as a 
multiple of the grant paid. Our modifications remain within this general 
framework. 
Oversimplifying to convey the essential point, it may be said that the old 
model took the cost to be the grant outlay, and the benefit to be 85 per cent of 
the wages generated through jobs created.12 This is equivalent to using a 
shadow wage rate of just 15 per cent, well below rates commonly reported in 
the literature. On the other hand, in order to be approved, projects had to satisfy 
a threshold benefit to cost ratio set arbitrarily at 4 to 1. 
While retaining the general approach, we see a need to modify the formula 
in three major respects, each of which forms the basis for one of the following 
three chapters.13 
First, the shadow wage rate needs to be increased to take better account of 
known general equilibrium effects. This also has a knock-on effect on the 
shadow prices of other inputs, since they are linked to the shadow wage 
through the estimated labour content of the inputs. 
Second, there has to be a fuller treatment of taxation, including tax revenue 
as a benefit offsetting grant costs and also applying a weighting (the 
shadow prices of public funds) before adding revenue benefits to private 
benefits. There is no basis for ignoring (as the old method did) tax revenue, 
including income tax and expenditure taxes, generated by the project as an 
offset to the grant cost incurred. 
 Third, projected benefits must be reduced by a deadweight factor, designed 
to take account both of the response elasticity of projects and jobs to grant 
levels and the degree to which an increase in grants can be confined to 
those projects that are actually dependent on it. 
 
12 Both directly in the project being grant-aided and indirectly from the project’s sub-
supply needs, cf. O’Malley (1995). 
13 Several additional modifications are not discussed in the present paper. 
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Our modifications partly reflect a new emphasis in the cost-benefit 
literature on system effects and also the increased importance and higher rates 
of taxation. This new approach does result in some alteration of the ranking of 
projects, and introduces a completely new approach to the threshold, though 
not a drastic change in practice to the cut-off. 
Although most of the discussion of the following chapters can be followed 
without recourse to mathematical notation, it is worth explicitly setting out the 
criterion function which underlies the discussion. Thus, for any given grant-aid 
application, the following ratio of costs to benefits function is calculated on the 
basis of projected flows: 
using the following notation: 
 π  is profits, 
 pi are the market prices of each input i,  
 νi are the ratios of shadow to market prices,  
 xi are the volumes of each input,  
 τi are the tax rates on each input (inclusive of a standard allowance for 
saving on social welfare payments resulting from a fall in 
unemployment),  
 
 τ0 is the tax rate on profits,  
 θ is the deadweight factor − the allowance for the fact that some grants 
will have been unnecessarily large, 
 
 φ is the shadow price of public funds, 
 g is the grant cost. 
All of these elements are calculated in present value terms. The changes 
from the old formula are the inclusion of the shadow price of public funds φ 
(this would previously have been unity) and in the deadweight factor θ (this 
would previously have been zero − but a threshold of 4 would have been 
imposed). 
In words, the formula simply sums the value (at shadow prices adjusted for 
the shadow price of public funds) of all the inputs, adds the taxes on inputs and 
profits and reduces the total by the deadweight factor to get a figure of the 
“benefits”, before dividing by the grant cost. 
 g)}/(+]+ )-[(1 p x){-(1 0iiiii φπτφτφνθ ∑  (1) 
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It may be helpful to looking at the formula step by step, beginning with the 
term immediately after the summation sign, which measures the net social 
benefit of one input (i) used in the project plus net tax revenue.14 
Here xi pi is the total market cost of the use of input i. If the shadow price of 
that input is equal to the market price, i does not contribute net value to the 
project. That is the meaning of the term: 1 - νi, it maps the market cost of the 
use of input i to the net social value. The tax rate τi is multiplied by the 
marginal cost of social funds φ as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 
below. 
This term is summed over all the inputs,15 and the tax revenue from profits 
– again multiplied by the marginal cost of social funds – is added to obtain the 
part between parentheses: 
which represents the total “benefits”. 
Finally, this is all premultiplied by the adjustment for deadweight (1-θ), 
before being divided by the grant “cost” g, which is also multiplied by the 
marginal cost of social funds φ. 
The next three chapters, in effect, discuss the choice of the three key 
parameters ν, φ, and θ. To anticipate the conclusions we can say here that, in 
contrast to the old procedure, we arrive at much higher figures for the ν’s, 
especially for labour where we use 0.8 instead of 0.15;16 The suggested value 
of φ is 1.5 (previously, in effect it was 1) and for θ ii is 0.8. Of course the other 
difference from the past is the inclusion of the tax revenues. 
 
14 As will be described below, in the case of labour, the tax element includes savings 
on social welfare. Thus we can think of these two elements as being essentially (i) the 
private benefit obtained by those individuals who are no longer involuntarily 
unemployed and (ii) the net additional cash flow to the Exchequer resulting from the 
additional employment and reduction in unemployment. 
15 All outputs are assumed to have shadow price equal to market price, so they do not 
contribute any net social benefit. 
16 As part of the wider review mentioned in Chapter 1, Eoin O’Malley has 
implemented an input-output approach allowing the νi’s for other inputs to be deduced 
from any given value of ν0. 
 ]+ )-[(1 p x iiii τφν   (2) 
 πτφτφν 0iiiii +]+ )-[(1 p x∑  (3) 
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Chapter 4 
MIGRATION AND THE SHADOW PRICE OF LABOUR  
The shadow wage rate is the key parameter required to carry out cost-
benefit analysis of Irish industrial policy. In terms of the general formula 
presented in the previous chapter, labour is the most important input, and the 
labour component of other domestic inputs is also important. That is why it is 
so important to get the shadow price of labour (the shadow wage) right. A high 
shadow wage implies that the labour resources being used have a high value in 
alternative use and conversely. In this chapter we argue that the high mobility 
of Irish workers implies and reflects the strength of alternative opportunities 
available to much of the Irish labour force abroad, and that this implies a high 
shadow wage. 
4.1 Current Practice 
In practice, the low shadow price of labour has been the major driver in the 
industrial development agencies’ cost-benefit methodology. McKeon (1979-
1980) remarked that the figure used was computed on the basis of assumed 
opportunity costs applied to the actual profile of employees recruited. For those 
not previously employed in Ireland a zero opportunity cost was assumed, while 
for those coming from employment in the agricultural, service and 
manufacturing sectors, the opportunity cost was set equal to the estimated 
market wage. McKeon also provides a table showing a sample distribution in 
1980, from which one could infer that the shadow wage would be at least two-
fifths of the market wage, since 47 per cent of the sample came from other 
employment.  
At a subsequent stage the shadow price was fixed at a much lower figure, 
namely 15 per cent of the market wage. It appears that the lower figure 
reflected an application of the previous approach to new survey information 
about the profile of employees (McMahon, 1985). But we will argue that both 
theoretical considerations applied to Ireland, and the example of other countries 
suggest that this 15 per cent figure is much too low. 
It may be noted that the agencies were not alone in using low shadow 
wages. Some recent cost-benefit studies of candidate projects for EU Structural 
Funding in Ireland have used even lower rates, without providing any 
justification.17 
 
17 Discussed in Honohan (1997). One of the studies in effect used a shadow wage of 
minus 5 per cent of the market wage; this appears to be a world record low value. 
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On theoretical grounds, the partial equilibrium methodology of using a 
sample profile of recruits must be rejected in favour of a general equilibrium 
analysis which takes account of the overall system response. In our view, the 
major theoretical argument here relates to migration.18 The rapid and 
substantial response of net migration to employment availability at home and 
abroad implies that job creation does not reduce unemployment one-for-one. 
As we will explain, the theoretical literature on the impact of migration on 
shadow wage rates shows that, even in the presence of involuntary 
unemployment, migration could fully eliminate any gap between shadow wage 
and market wage except to the extent that job creation does have an impact on 
unemployment. 
International practice also argues against a major gap between market and 
shadow wage. In Canada, the shadow wage used is 95 per cent of the market 
wage; in the UK the shadow wage is set equal to the market wage. Even for 
developing countries, practice points in the same direction. According to Little 
and Mirrlees (1991) “there is a consensus that the shadow wage is probably not 
very different from the wage paid” for modern-sector urban wages in 
developing countries.19,20 It is no longer credible to use as low a shadow wage 
as has been the practice to date in Ireland. 
At this stage it may be desirable to recall that, as with most applications of 
cost-benefit analysis, we maintain the Utilitarian premise that what is to be 
optimised is an aggregate of the economic welfare of the individuals in society. 
The familiarity of this assumption to economists should not allow one to 
neglect the fact that it reflects a very focused philosophical and political 
position. Thus, the social decisions in relation to the level of unemployment 
which our method proposes are based on the impact of unemployment on 
individual welfare, and not on an independently determined employment goal 
for society.21 
4.2 The Basic Theoretical Insight 
It has long been recognised in the literature that migration could affect the 
shadow price of labour. A quarter of a century ago, Harris and Todaro (1970) 
 
18 The migration aspect was also mentioned by Ruane (1979), though her (1980) 
paper focuses instead on distributional issues. 
19 A survey by MacArthur (1994) of shadow wage rates used in semi-input-output 
analyses of shadow prices reveals that the lowest of 33 shadow wages used was 0.26 
times the market wage − and that was for unskilled labour in Ecuador. The unweighted 
mean of the shadow wages used was 0.67 and the maximum value was 1.13. 
20 Some apparent contradictions to this consensus turn out to have little relevance to 
the problem at issue. For example, a study for Northern Ireland by Kirkpatrick and 
MacArthur (1990) arrived at a very low shadow price for a worker leaving 
unemployment for a job. But the approach used in that study wholly neglected 
migration and other systemic responses and is mainly relevant to ring-fenced 
employment schemes targeted at the long-term unemployed. 
21 Sen (1975) discusses some alternatives. 
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proposed a simple model of migration which displays the basic argument. They 
considered two regions between which labour is free to migrate. The first 
region relies on subsistence agriculture, the other is a modern urban economy 
whose wage rate wm is pitched above market clearing levels and results in a rate 
of unemployment u. The agricultural region has full employment, but at a low 
and constant labour productivity wa. 
If potential migrants equate their expected earnings in the two regions,  
the equilibrium unemployment rate will be: 
Since the creation of an extra job in the urban sector will induce 1/(1-u) 
migrants (just enough to restore the equilibrium unemployment rate), the 
opportunity cost of the extra job is the loss of output of these migrants. Thus, 
the shadow price of labour v is: 
The implication of this very simple model is that, despite the persistence of 
unemployment in the urban region (indeed, because of the persistence of 
unemployment) the shadow wage rate is not lower than the wage actually paid 
in the urban region. 
Though quickly endorsed by Harberger, Stiglitz and other distinguished 
economists, this result did not immediately attract general acceptance because 
of the very strong assumptions on which it was based and also because 
observed unemployment rates in the urban areas of developing countries 
seemed much lower than would be implied by the relation (5) above. As Sen 
(1975) put it, “the invisible hand strikes again” in a way that seems unduly 
reductionist, and a number of objections can be raised to the analysis. 
But subsequent analysis has shown that some of these objections have less 
force against the high shadow wage conclusion than might have been expected. 
Much more elaborate and realistic models still lead to the conclusion that the 
shadow wage rate should be close to the marginal product of labour in the 
urban sector.22 
 
22 These models assume that the objective of the social planner is to maximise a 
weighted average of individual expected utilities, i.e., the standard approach and one 
which is also adopted here. It is worth noting, however, that if the social planner were 
instead to take account of the ex post inequality in utilities resulting from the 
  ,wu)-(1=w ma  (4) 
 . 
w
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4.3 Qualifying the Basic Theory 
Although devised to account for rural-urban migration in developing 
countries, this literature has an obvious application to Ireland. In lieu of the 
agricultural region we have emigrant population working in the UK and 
elsewhere. In lieu of the fixed agricultural income, these emigrants receive a 
“utility package” which is insensitive to Irish labour market conditions. Irish 
wage rates are largely set by negotiation and are higher than would be 
necessary to clear the market.23 The hypotheses that Irish unemployment 
adjusts fully to changes in the UK rate of unemployment and that fluctuations 
in domestic employment levels have only a transitory effect on domestic 
unemployment obtain some empirical support from econometric studies 
(Honohan, 1984, 1992, Bradley, Whelan and Wright, 1995).24 Ignoring, for a 
moment, the duration of this transition, we thus have the necessary components 
for an application in Ireland of the theories leading to a shadow-price of labour 
equal to the going wage rate. (Annex 1 elaborates on the question of 
quantification in the Irish context). 
In order to escape the tyranny of the invisible hand, we must therefore 
closely scrutinise the key assumptions of these models to see what deviation 
may be justified. It seems that the result hinges on whether job creation in the 
city alters (i) the unemployment rate in the city or (ii) living conditions in the 
rural area. In the simple model above neither occurs. 
At first sight it might seem that a different specification of the utility 
function whose optimisation drives the behaviour of potential migrants might 
matter. But, as shown by Heady (1981), much more realistic utility functions 
still predict the result that the rate of urban unemployment is insensitive to job 
creation in the city, and hence would not alter the condition ν = wm . Heady’s 
model allows the migrant to consider the possibility of a number of different 
possible outcomes − perhaps a long wait before a job materialised, perhaps an 
immediate job followed by a layoff followed by return to the rural sector, and 
so on. In particular this allows for preferences such that potential migrants 
would require an earnings premium to induce them to travel. So long as the 
expected utility of these options can be expressed as a function of the wages 
and the numbers employed in both regions, the same type of reasoning can be 
applied. Expected utility will be equalised as between those who migrate and 
 
persistence of unemployment, this would tend to raise the shadow price of labour rather 
than lowering it, because the higher the shadow wage, the higher the urban population 
and so the higher the number of unemployed. 
23 Note that higher-than-market-clearing wage rates can be rationalised in a number 
of ways, including the efficiency wage theory, insider-outsider models, etc. 
24 This does not preclude a role for relative wage rates and relative unemployment 
benefit rates. 
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those who do not, and maintenance of this equilibrium will ensure that the 
urban unemployment rate will remain insensitive to job creation there.25 
In a developing country context, it is quite likely that, by reducing 
population pressure on the land, urban job creation would impact rural incomes 
favourably, thereby upsetting the simple shadow price rule (6). But it is hard to 
see how emigration from the UK to Ireland could have much impact on the UK 
labour market, so the relevance of this generalisation to the Irish case is 
doubtful. 
Several other generalisations26 likewise fail to provide any convincing 
support for reducing the shadow wage below the market wage. For example, 
Bell (1991) notes that the prices of goods might be different because of barriers 
to trade, and spending preferences may change for those who migrate. 
Likewise, the unearned income of migrants may differ from that of the host 
population. These factors can certainly cause the shadow price of labour to 
deviate from the wage rate, but there is no presumption as to which way the 
effect will go. Furthermore, several of these effects seem unlikely to be of 
quantitative significance in the Irish context. For example, price distortions due 
to barriers to trade seem negligible in the Irish context. 
So far we have implicitly assumed that the urban wage has been set above 
the market clearing level by some autonomous process. A feed-back effect of 
job creation onto the urban wage could upset the relationship of Equation (6) 
above. A tendency for increased employment to drive up the wage would 
increase the shadow wage rate. But such an effect is not guaranteed. For 
example, as noted by Sah and Stiglitz (1985), efficiency wage theories which 
assume that the wage is above market-clearing level because of a link between 
wage rate and productivity, and because private firms are minimising the labour 
cost per efficiency unit, predict no sensitivity of the market wage to 
employment levels. 
Of the various assumptions whose relaxation would have a systematic 
impact on the shadow price, one of the most striking is the implicit idea that the 
pool of potential migrants is homogeneous. If we relax this condition, allowing 
segments of the population to differ in their propensity to migrate, then an 
expansion in domestic employment could have an impact on domestic 
unemployment. After all, if all of the most mobile immigrants have already 
arrived, then it will take a lower unemployment rate to induce further 
immigration. The marginal migrant will still be indifferent between staying 
abroad or coming home, but the lower unemployment will confer an external 
 
25 This formulation does not deal with the possibilities that the subjective 
probabilities do not equal the objective probabilities, or that expected utility theory 
does not apply (cf. Sen, 1975). If the migration response is not necessarily tied to 
equalisation of expected utility, then, as shown by Sah and Stiglitz (1985), the shadow 
wage rate is higher the more workers migrate, and vice versa.  
26 Particularly relevant papers not otherwise mentioned are Bell and Devarajan 
(1983), Burgess (1989), Dinwiddy and Teal (1987) and Gemmel and Papps (1991). 
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benefit on those who are at home. If so the shadow price of labour would be 
lower than the wage. As noted, this would require the unemployment rate to be 
sensitive to the level of domestic employment. In this context it has to be 
stressed that, while not inconsistent with a zero long-term response, the 
empirical evidence for Ireland referred to earlier cannot conclusively refute the 
hypothesis that there is some sensitivity. 
4.4  Some Possible Misconceptions 
Recognising that the proposed increase in the shadow-wage could be 
controversial, it is worth summarising the policy message that is being drawn 
from the analysis, and clarifying a few points on which there may be 
misconceptions. 
First, it should be clear that the goal of reduction in unemployment is not at 
all being neglected in our analysis. On the contrary, we are making sure that 
credit is taken only for a realistic estimate of the unemployment impact of job 
creation. Other measures (such as targeted training schemes, improvements in 
the structure of taxation, employment legislation and structural improvements 
in labour relations) are all relevant in that context, but not here. 
Second, we are not saying that emigrants are indifferent between being at 
home and being abroad. What our approach does imply is that the marginal27 
emigrant is indifferent between the average package of benefits (employment 
and employment prospects, wages, etc.) at home and abroad. For example, the 
emigrant might be prepared to accept a big cut in wages to come home. 
Third, we are not discriminating between emigrants and residents in 
counting benefits. The actual distinction that is being made is between the 
impact of a new job on the unemployment conditions at home and abroad. 
There is an impact on the domestic job market; but there is no impact on the 
foreign job market. So when an emigrant returns to take a job in Ireland, that 
does not improve the lot of the remaining emigrants. 
Finally, our concrete quantified recommendation does not take the extreme 
view of instant adjustment through migration that is set out in the above 
equations. Clearly job creation does have a temporary effect on unemployment, 
and Annex 1 discusses the empirical evidence on how big this effect is. The 
recommendation to use a shadow wage of (v1 = 0.8) is drawn from that 
discussion. It could also be consistent with a small permanent effect of job 
creation on unemployment. 
4.5  External Benefits of Reduced Migration 
What our approach does omit is any account of the external benefits of 
reduced emigration, i.e., the benefits that accrue to persons other than the 
migrants. One could imagine, for example, that parents and relatives might 
wish that their relatives were living in Ireland. Return migration would benefit 
 
27 As usual in economic analysis, it is the marginal that matters for optimal pricing: it 
is the marginal unit that establishes the equilibrium price. 
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these relatives even if it did not reduce unemployment.28 Depopulation can 
generate external costs also − it is not frivolous to recall the sense of loss and 
inadequacy felt by some rural football clubs in the 1980s when they found they 
could not field a full team because of a heavy wave of emigration among the 
young men. Depopulation is the obverse of congestion costs. (Our method 
ignores the alleviation of congestion costs also.) 
While these kinds of consideration could lead to looking at reduction in 
emigration or job creation per se as distinct objectives, and could be advanced 
as a justification for reducing the shadow wage, there are serious difficulties in 
quantifying such external benefits. The use of a questionnaire approach 
(“contingent valuation”) is subject to the sorts of objections that have been 
raised in the context of attempts to place a value on ecological diversity 
through questionnaire methods (see above). 
Furthermore, the policy importance of such external benefits may not be as 
large as is sometimes supposed. Because of the Government’s budget 
constraint, additional public expenditure on job creation beyond the point 
where conventional benefits fell below cost would result in higher tax rates. 
This potential trade-off between higher employment and lower after-tax wages 
(Kennedy, 1992) may in turn be limited by the migration response. Resolving 
these large issues seems beyond the scope of the present study. 
The labour market is often thought to be segmented, with most of the long-
term unemployed unable to compete with other participants. For one thing, 
some of the new jobs created by FDI tend to make higher demands on skill 
levels than jobs in the so-called traditional sector. To the extent that these skill 
differentials are reflected in wage rates, the methodology does take account of 
them. A more important aspect of segregation relates to the long-term 
unemployed; the whole argument about migration does not really apply to job 
creation that is successfully targeted on the long-term unemployed, as this 
group shows much lower international mobility. A lower shadow wage would 
therefore be assigned to sheltered or ring-fenced employment schemes 
designed for this special group (cf. Snower, 1994). 
Emigration has long reflected serious economic and social problems in 
Ireland. Involuntary emigration resulting from the failure of a malfunctioning 
economy to generate sufficient job opportunities is to be deplored. It is also an 
emotive issue, but that should not prevent a coherent analytical approach. An 
approach that implicitly treats every emigrant as an unemployed member of the 
Irish labour force is not coherent, and will not give the right answer to the 
relevant policy questions. As acknowledged, the present approach may take too 
simple and too sanguine a view of out-migration (as well as of in-migration) 
downplaying issues other than economic productivity. Our submission is that 
 
28 This could already be taken account of to the extent that migrants internalise the 
preferences of their relatives. 
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what is being neglected − chiefly the willingness of the marginal migrant to 
accept a lower real income in order to live in Ireland is certainly small. 
Annex 1 draws on recent empirical work on labour mobility and the link 
between job creation and unemployment in an attempt to quantify what 
deviation from the theoretical benchmark of 100 per cent of the market wage 
rate implied by the simplest formal models above. We arrive at a figure of 80 
per cent (v1 = 0.8), which could accommodate some of the more subtle 
concerns discussed here. 
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Chapter 5 
DISTORTING TAXATION AND THE MARGINAL SOCIAL VALUE OF 
PUBLIC FUNDS 
Just how does taxation enter the picture? This is one of the trickiest aspects 
of policy evaluation in a tax-distorted economy, yet it is an important one. 
Indeed, neglect of the impact of distorting taxation seems to be the most serious 
conceptual gap in the appraisal framework used to date. In this chapter we 
develop an interpretation of the discriminatory nature of Irish tax-and-grant 
policy which provides a basis for arguing that tax receipts attributable to the 
project must be included as a benefit29 and indeed that they should be assigned 
a high value reflecting the marginal cost of public funds. Thus this chapter is 
concerned with the terms in τ and φ in the formula of Chapter 3 above. This 
interpretation of policy will also be used in Chapter 6 below to resolve the 
deadweight issue. 
5.1 Interpreting Existing Policy  
If we have a good system of economic cost-benefit analysis, we should be 
able to give a ready answer to two commonly asked questions about Irish 
industrial policy: 
Q.1 “The grant-cost per job approved rarely exceeds £30,000; the 1994 
average was only £17,100.But the tax revenue − income tax, PRSI, VAT 
and excises − paid by an average industrial worker over seven years would 
alone approach £30,000 − and that does not count savings on social welfare 
payments. Why aren’t the agencies prepared to pay more if there is no net 
Exchequer cost?”30 
 
29 Hitherto, Exchequer flows were considered during project appraisal in a separate 
check, and were not integrated into the cost-benefit calculation. 
30 Note, however that cost-per-job approved began to increase again in the early 
1990s. For indigenous companies it averaged £10,400 in 1989-91, but has increased 
steadily since then through £13,300 in 1992 and £15,000 in 1993. The cost-per-job 
sustained over the period 1987-94 was £11,400. (The cost per job concepts are as used 
by the agencies. Simplifying slightly, the cost-per-job approved is an ex ante concept: 
the total of grants approved for projects during the period stated divided by the total 
number of lasting jobs expected to be created by the time the approved projects are 
fully operational. The cost-per-job sustained is an ex post concept: the total grants paid 
during a seven year period divided by the total number of jobs created during that 
period and still in effect at the end of the period.) 
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 Q.2  “Why can’t a job-creating initiative in the non-traded sector get grants 
on the same scale as manufacturing?” 
These are not easy questions to answer and, in attempting to do so, one 
must beware of the temptation to rationalise elements of existing policy which 
may be the matter of legitimate debate. But it is a serious weakness of the 
existing methodology that it cannot provide a satisfactory answer to either 
question. 
The key to answering such questions is to take account of the fact that 
Government has revenue requirements for purposes outside the scope of 
industrial policy. These include covering the cost of various public and social 
services − health, education, roads and so on − and servicing its debt. As a 
result, distorting taxation is imposed on various forms of economic activity − 
and the higher the tax rates, the more severe the distortion.31 In large part, the 
puzzles implied by questions Q.1 and Q.2 above simply reflect the tax 
distortion. 
5.2  The Shadow Price of Public Funds 
So, in order to raise its basic revenue needs, the Government has to impose 
taxes which drive a wedge between cost and benefit at the margin. This in turn 
means that the Government should not finance all projects that yield a net 
benefit. It has to take account of the damaging side-effect of the extra tax that 
will be entailed. Taxation of factors of production discourages economic 
activity and its distorting effects are clear, especially where unemployment 
prevails. 
This provides a possible answer to the question Q.1. Economic activity 
must yield tax revenue. If the Government and its agencies reduce taxes or 
increase grants to the point where the “net Exchequer cost” is zero, the revenue 
needed to fund public and social services for the economy will not be 
forthcoming. 
A standard way of taking account of this revenue need is to build in to cost-
benefit calculations a “shadow price or marginal cost of public funds”. This is a 
factor (in this context greater than unity) by which grant and tax funds are 
multiplied in order to make them commensurate with private flows in the 
calculation. The purpose of the factor is to take account of the distortions that 
would be created (at the margin) by the extra taxation that would have to be 
imposed elsewhere in the economy in order to make good any loss of revenue 
arising from the project being evaluated (cf. Heady, 1988). 
 
 
31 The scale of the distortion is often thought to rise with the square of the tax rate. 
Note also, however, that some sources of taxation − such as some energy taxes, tobacco 
and alcohol taxes − both raise revenue and correct pre-existing distortions. But the 
revenue from such corrective taxes is insufficient to meet the revenue needs of the 
economy. 
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5.3  The Government as a Discriminating Monopolist 
There is another twist to the story, and this is more specific to the case of 
Irish industrial policy. What we have observed over the past two decades (and 
in somewhat different form for much longer) is a sharp differentiation between 
the tax-and-grant treatment of certain broad categories of productive activity. 
The precise structure of this differentiation is quite complex, but an important 
feature is that manufacturing and certain internationally traded services have 
been eligible for a low corporation profits tax and for grant-aid. 
We all know of example where monopolists charge different prices in 
different locations. Every microeconomics textbook provides the simple 
calculation that shows how such price discrimination can increase the 
monopolist’s profits if the elasticity of demand in the two segments of her 
market are different. As long as the two segments of the market can be 
segregated, she simply raises the price for the low-elasticity group, and lowers 
it for the high-elasticity group. The discriminating monopolist will then 
typically increase production, and thereby increasing overall economic benefit 
(as well as profits). 
The interpretation which we would like to propose for this policy structure 
is that the Government (directly and through its agencies) is acting in just the 
same manner. It is offering a two-tier regime in order benefit from a higher 
elasticity in the preferred sector. Indeed, this higher elasticity will see not only 
greater employment generated, but will also be effective in clawing back 
through volume much of the revenue lost through the more generous regime. 
That is why the tax receipts must be included in the cost-benefit formula if we 
are not to overstate the cost of the policy. 
If every economic activity were to be eligible not only for the low 
corporation tax rate, but also for a grant of £17,100 per job, the impact on the 
Exchequer would be catastrophic.32 Instead, such a regime is open only to a 
limited segment of the economy. Effectively, the preferred category is offered a 
more favourable environment than the rest of the economy. Provided the 
elasticity of activity (with respect to the tax-and-grant rate) in the favoured 
sector is sufficiently greater than that in the other, the decline in the less 
favoured sector will be less than the expansion in the favoured sector. 
Sufficient Exchequer revenue will thereby be generated to pay for needed 
Government services, while at the same time a greater level of economic 
activity will be induced. 
By discriminating between categories of enterprise then, the Government is 
acting in a manner analogous to that of the textbook discriminating monopolist. 
Substitute “mobile or footloose investors” for “high elasticity group”, picture 
the Government, including its industrial promotion agencies, as the monopolist 
 
32 The announced unification of the corporation tax rate is at 12½ per cent rather than 
10 per cent, significantly mitigating the tax loss. 
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and we have a plausible first approximation to the design of industrial 
incentives. 
Even if all other shadow prices were equal to market prices, this new 
approach could provide a possible reason for discriminating between categories 
in terms of tax rates and grants. Provided a sector or category of enterprises can 
be identified that has a more elastic response of economic activity with respect 
to the tax regime, and provided it can be ring-fenced away from other 
categories33 for the purposes of tax (and grant), then the total tax revenue 
required can be raised with lower distortion and lower social costs by 
presenting the high elasticity category with a more favourable tax regime.34 
We thus also have a possible answer for the second question (Q.2) in so far 
as the non-traded sector may on average have a lower elasticity of response to 
tax-and-grant rates than does manufacturing. The discriminatory policy could 
be rationalised in this manner.35 In order to verify the logical consistency of 
this argument, we have worked out a very simple algebraic model of tax policy 
displaying this discrimination feature (Annex 2).36 
Has the Government chosen the right dividing line between favoured 
sectors and the rest? At present, manufacturing and certain internationally 
traded services have a lower corporation tax rate, and may be eligible for 
grants; within this group, small firms appear to be separated by administrative 
practice and receive a lower rate of grant.37 This ranking does seem to accord 
with a priori views as to the mobility or elasticity of these categories. But there 
are many other possibilities: for example one could divide between large and 
small firms. An even more natural distinction would be between foreign-owned 
vs. Irish-owned, or between foreign-owned and traded vs. the rest, but such 
classifications would surely fall foul of EU law. As discussed in Chapter 6 
below, in assessing whether the classifications could be improved, one would 
need to consider not only issues of elasticity, but also the inevitable leakages 
and other distortions caused at the margins of the identified categories. 
 
33 Sometimes, as occurred with tax breaks for leasing, the intended ring-fence breaks 
down. 
34 This can be seen as a simple application of optimal Ramsey taxation, where taxes 
are imposed at rates that are inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand. 
35 It must be pointed out that, because it distorts the productive sector’s input 
decisions, such a policy is not the optimal policy in the standard framework as 
proposed by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). Only if the menu of taxes available to the 
government is restricted should taxes that distort production decisions be used. For 
present purposes we are taking it that some such restriction applies. 
36 This model can be seen as evolving from the approach proposed by Ruane (1979), 
though the emphasis here is rather different. In designing the model, we have had 
particular reference to the framework presented in Marchand et al. (1984). 
37 New foreign industry typically used to receive the highest rates of grant, but in 
recent years the gap between the average grant-cost-per-job approved for foreign and 
indigenous industry has effectively been eliminated. 
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5.4  Is Ireland's Two-tier Industrial Policy Optimal?  
Here we are trying to interpret the two-tier policy, not to provide an 
apologia for it. To make this point consider the following: 
 First, there may be better policy instruments that could supersede the 
mainly tax-and-grant based policy regime that is being used at present. 
Second, no account is taken of some overall negative consequences of the 
policy regime. For example, the very existence of a degree of discretion 
may lead to the rent-seeking behaviour and what the Culliton group (1992) 
referred to as the “hand-out mentality”. This provides a powerful argument 
against the whole policy approach, at least so far as the relatively immobile 
indigenous firms are concerned.38 
 Third, (on the other hand), no account is taken of some positive effects of 
the regime: including such aspects as the dynamising role of the steady 
stream of new foreign investment on management quality, the signalling or 
band-wagon effect of the arrival of new foreign industry on the likelihood 
of other potential investors in the same sector reassessing Ireland as a 
possible location, and so on. 
 Fourth, the question of factor bias: has the low rate of corporation tax and 
the way in which grants are structured tended to discriminate against labour 
usage? This is a knotty question which has never been wholly resolved. 
Even when the statutory ceiling on grants is expressed in terms of a fraction 
of fixed capital investment, it is clear that this ceiling tends to be reached 
only for job-rich projects. Besides, in terms of inward direct investment, 
the main concern is the overall volume of jobs, not the capital-labour ratio. 
The influence of the low rate of corporation tax has not been labour-saving 
in any simple way.39 The tax-bias against labour comes as much or more 
from the structure of income tax and social insurance contributions as from 
the low rate of corporation tax. 
It is beyond the scope of the paper to assess whether the overall approach 
to industrial policy is the best possible one. Our objective has been rather to 
formalise the logic of the present policy framework, and to provide a tool 
which will lead to correct grant-decisions within that framework.40 
 
38 Other adverse consequences of discriminating between categories have recently 
been assessed by O’Rourke (1994) and by Barry and Hannan (1995).  
39 It favours firms who have paid tax at a high rate in another country. There is no 
presumption that the Irish operations of such firms would be capital intensive, though 
they need to be able to show profits to make the most of the tax break. For an account 
of the characteristics of some of the most dynamic sectors of inward FDI in Ireland, see 
Honohan, Maître and Conroy (1998). 
40 Other sectors, including building, tourism, sheltered professional services, and so 
on also benefit from privileges under other elements of the tax and legislative code; we 
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This chapter has argued that taxes indirectly clawed back as a result of the 
grant-aided activities should be included as a benefit. And that all government 
revenue flows should be valued at premium reflecting the marginal cost of 
social funds. This appropriate premium (the φ of Chapter 3) is lower than it 
would have been when marginal tax rates were somewhat higher, but a rate of 
1.5 would be in line with the literature.41 
 
would not wish to argue that all of these privileges form part of a consistent strategy 
along the lines here discussed for industrial incentive policy. 
41 Honohan and Irvine (1987, 1990) provide estimates for this parameter appropriate 
to Ireland in the mid-1980s. They ranged from 1.75 to 2.44. Since 1984 top marginal 
tax rates have been falling, and bearing in mind the rule-of-thumb that deadweight costs 
of taxation are roughly proportional to the square of the tax rate, it would be necessary 
to revise the marginal cost of social funds estimate to, perhaps as low as 1.5. 
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Chapter 6 
DEADWEIGHT AND BARGAINING 
Nobody likes to come out of a bargaining situation with the sense that the 
other party might have conceded more. Yet this will normally have been the 
case. If there is a surplus to be divided, one or both parties must have got at 
least some of it. Here is where the issue of deadweight arises. If it were just a 
question of setting a tax rate to apply to a large class of investors, the rate that 
is chosen results inmost investors coming away with some surplus. Likewise 
some who would have invested had there been no tax will be priced out. 
But a discretionary grant is different. With full information, the agencies 
could offer to each applicant the minimum grant sufficient to induce all to 
invest. With imperfect information the crucial question is: what grant rate to 
offer. It would be too generous to accept all applicants whose proposals 
generated social benefits greater than the proposed grant cost. After all, a small 
lowering of the grant rate would likely still see the project go ahead, and there 
would have been a definite saving of public funds. The situation is similar to 
the so-called winner’s curse in auctions. Not knowing the reservation price of 
others, it makes sense to bid below one’s own reservation price. And the 
appropriate policy here is to shade the maximum grant rate below what a naive 
cost-benefit calculation would indicate. Or in other words to discount the 
estimated benefits by a special factor (1-θ in the formula of Chapter 3). 
This chapter presents a method for arriving at the appropriate deadweight 
factor to ensure that excessive grants are not paid. 
6.1  The Issue of Deadweight 
Confining ourselves therefore to the question of how to evaluate individual 
grant applications within the context of an existing policy structure, we must 
now consider how to take account of the problem of deadweight in the grant 
system (taking the tax system as a given). 
The purpose of pre-multiplying the total project benefits (net-of-grant) by a 
deadweight factor (given in the formula of Chapter 3 as 1-θ) is to ensure that 
the grant-level for the marginal project, i.e., the project which has a benefit-cost 
ratio of one, is pitched at the correct level. Increasing this maximum allowable 
grant-to-benefit ratio will induce further projects, but at a cost in additional 
aggregate grant outlay. The correct setting of the maximum allowable grant-to-
benefit ratio will be such that any increase would yield benefits lower than the 
aggregate increase in grant outlay; any reduction would cut back benefits more 
than grant aggregate grants. 
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In order to estimate the correct value θ by which the benefits should be 
discounted (or equivalently the maximum grant-to-benefit ratio 1-θ) we need to 
know how responsive aggregate project benefits are to grant levels, and also by 
how much aggregate grant costs increase with an increase in the maximum 
allowable grant-to-benefit ratio. If every project were to receive the maximum 
grant, then the second part of this calculation would be relatively simple, and 
we could focus on the first, namely the degree to which higher grants will 
induce a certain additional volume of projects and of jobs created. Given an 
estimate of the elasticity − the proportional response of these benefits with 
respect to the level of grant − it would then be possible to calculate the maximal 
grant-to-benefit ratio (1-θ), i.e., the ratio beyond which the increase in benefits 
secured is less than the increase in the grant paid. 
In an ideal world of full information, infra-marginal projects – those that do 
not require the maximal grant in order to go ahead – would not be given the 
maximal grant. For such projects there is a “rent” – the gap between the 
maximum grant that would still result in a net social benefit and the minimum 
grant required to ensure that the project goes ahead. The minimum grant is 
welfare maximising, and should be the preferred option for the State. 
Legislation provides for this, and the agencies make their best efforts to capture 
as much of the “rent” as possible, given their information and given 
competition from foreign agencies. Nevertheless there will undoubtedly be 
some leakage and an increase in the maximal grant rate will tend to increase 
grants provided generally. 
The two major components of the deadweight factor are thus (i) the 
elasticity of response and (ii) the degree of leakage to infra-marginal projects. 
We deal with these separately by first considering the case where there is full 
leakage: an increase in the maximal grant/benefit ratio is passed to all projects. 
This case is analysed in Section 6.2. We then proceed in Section 6.3 to model 
the leakage, arriving at a modified deadweight factor leading to higher grants. 
Section 6.4 considers the issue of whether it is desirable to vary the deadweight 
by category of project. The discussion is necessarily somewhat technical. 
6.2  Simple Case 
In order to place a value on the parameter θ then, we need to use 
information concerning the response of additional projects, or larger projects, to 
a less onerous grant regime. A generally higher grant will induce more benefits, 
chiefly through direct and indirect employment, as more projects are 
implemented. Quantification of this effect relies on macroeconometric models. 
The most successful models of Irish economic growth have employed a 
two-stage decision process by firms (e.g., Bradley and Fitz Gerald, 1988). In 
the first stage, the location decision is taken on the basis of overall factor-price 
competitiveness. In a second stage, the capital-labour ratio is chosen on the 
basis of relative factor prices. When the consequential capital stock is put in 
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place, actual labour will vary below full-capacity demand depending on 
demand conditions. 
Within this framework, the role of grants may be two-fold. First, they 
improve aggregate factor price competitiveness by lowering the cost of locating 
in Ireland. Second, they may influence the capital-labour ratio. The second 
effect is controversial: early critiques that suggested a pro-capital bias have 
become muted (see Ruane, 1979, for references). More recently, operational 
ceilings on grant-cost-per-job have had the effect of making grants closer to 
wage subsidies, though this bias may not be large.42 
In order to estimate the magnitude of the employment response then, it is 
reasonable to begin with econometric estimates of the wage-sensitivity of the 
demand for labour. One useful source of such information is the table of 
elasticities of demand for labour estimated by Bradley, Fitz Gerald and 
Kearney (1993). For instance, we can use their estimate of -0.55 as the long-
term elasticity of demand for labour in high-tech manufacturing with respect to 
the real (tax-inclusive) wage cost.  
In terms of the location decision, the grant can be treated as fungible: only 
its total value matters, and not whether it is based on labour or other costs. 
When it comes to the factor intensity decision, it does matter whether the basis 
for awarding grants makes them more like labour subsidies or more like capital 
subsidies. But it only matters to the extent to which labour and capital are 
substitutable in each project − not likely to be high in most cases. If grants were 
simply a labour subsidy, and if all the economic benefits were proportional to 
employment, we could apply the labour demand elasticity directly to the 
purpose at hand. Neither assumption is exactly correct, but they should be 
adequate to give the correct order of magnitude. Any alternative assumptions 
would hardly command more credibility. Accordingly we will proceed on the 
basis of these two assumptions. 
In the “simple case”, where an increase in the grant rate applies uniformly 
across all projects, the corresponding value of maximum grant/benefit ratio 1-θ 
is calculated as the ratio at which the marginal impact of grant-rate on benefits 
is equal to its marginal impact on costs. It is based, as explained above, on a 
simplified model of the grant process in which both benefits and grants are 
proportional to jobs. 
Assume, then, that (instead of the more elaborate model of Chapter 3) the 
social benefit B of the project is simply proportional to the employment created 
L. 
 B = ψ L. 
 
42 As mentioned above, even when statutory ceilings on grant-levels are expressed as 
a fraction of fixed capital formation, the ceilings are not often reached, and the grants 
paid do vary in accordance with many other conditions. It is no longer clear in what 
direction grants influence relative factor prices: the influence may be in different 
directions for different projects. 
 DEADWEIGHT AND BARGAINING 29 
  
The cost C is taken as equal to the product of the grant-cost per job g and 
the employment L. We write the net-of-grant wage as: 
 
 w=w0 - g. 
and deduce that the response of overall benefits and grant costs to a change in the 
grant rate g is: 
and  
where η is the elasticity of demand for labour with respect to the wage. 
At the maximal grant level gˆ , (i.e. the grant-level which is optimal for the 
category ignoring the possibility of improving on it through project-level 
negotiations) dB/dC = 1. Therefore, 
From which we deduce that, at the maximal grant level, the benefit to cost ratio is: 
 
Substituting the value of the elasticity 0.55, and an average grant-to-wage 
ratio of 0.1543 yields an estimate of 1-θ of 0.076. That is the factor the 
measured benefits would have to be reduced by in the formula of Chapter 3 − a 
very considerable reduction. 
Using the labour demand elasticity estimated by the same authors for 
traditional manufacturing, namely 0.15, 1-θ falls to 0.022. Thus low labour 
 
43 This is approximately the present average ratio in practice. Using this figure 
therefore implicitly assumes that the present grant levels are about right on average. If 
application of the new method led to greatly altered average grant levels, then (strictly 
speaking) this figure would have to be revised in the same direction leading to a 
slightly larger adjustment in average grant levels. 
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demand elasticities lead to very substantial reductions to benefit for deadweight 
and thus to low figures for the maximum grant.44 
6.3  Partial Leakage: Dividing the Surplus 
In order to take account of the fact that the agencies are in a bargaining 
position with project promoters, and will try to secure the project for the 
minimum grant, we need to modify the simple formula obtained above to take 
account of the fact that an increase in the maximum grant level is not fully 
passed on to infra-marginal projects. 
Our approach to this problem is to recognise that each infra-marginal 
project involves a surplus which is shared in some proportion λ between the 
agencies and the promoter. The classic solution to how the surplus is divided is 
known as Nash’s bargaining solution (Nash, 1953). According to this solution, 
the share will depend on the relative degree of risk aversion of the bargainers. 
Extensions to the Nash bargaining solution (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990) 
also take into account possible differences in time preferences of the 
bargainers, or in the cost to them of a delay in arriving at a bargain. 
An implication of this standard theory is that, if the bargainers are identical 
in the relevant respects (risk aversion, time preference), then they will split the 
surplus equally, λ=0.5. 
As will be shown below, the sharing of benefits in the proportion λ (for the 
promoter), 1-λ (for the agencies) results in a reduction in the leakage by a 
factor of  
λµ )+(1
2  
where µ is the fraction of employment that would exist even if grants were zero. If 
λ were zero, leakage would be zero and 1-θ would converge to unity: in that case 
the full benefit of the specific project could be paid out in grants. Taking both µ 
and λ to be one-half gives a reduction in the leakage by a factor of 2.67, thereby 
raising 1-θ from 0.076 to 0.202. This figure, implying θ = 0.798, we take as our 
basic recommendation for normal circumstances. 
In order to explain the reduction in leakage, we refer to Figures A, B and C. 
The sloped line in Figure A illustrates the dependence of jobs on the grant rate 
g. At zero grants, the number of jobs is x_ ; if grants are paid up to the level g', 
the number of jobs is x'. If the same per-job grant g' is paid for all projects, 
there is (for all but the marginal job at x'), what we may think of as a potential 
surplus to the promoter. This is the source of the deadweight. For the jobs 
corresponding to the part of the figure to the left of x_ the surplus is equal to 
the full amount of the grant g', as these jobs would exist even if no grants were 
offered. For jobs to the right of x_ , the surplus is lower by the height of the line 
x_A. The shaded area in Figure B shows the increase in the surplus if the 
 
44 The parallel with the model of Annex 2 will be evident. 
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common grant is increased from g' to g'' =g'+∆g. Writing x1 = 0.5(x' + x''), this 
increase in surplus equals x1 ∆g. But if the agencies attempt to claw back some 
of this surplus by varying the grant where they believe that they are dealing 
with an infra-marginal project, the promoters’ surplus is lower. Figure C 
assumes, in line with the algebraic development above, that the promoter 
obtains a constant fraction λ of the surplus for each job. The area between the 
two kinked lines represents the increased promoters’ surplus in this case. It is a 
straightforward calculation to show that this area is approximately equal to: 
 
g)x+x(2 10
∆
λ  
And if the number of jobs that would exist even in the absence of grants, x_ 
is a fraction µ of x1, then the above formula is established, considering that in 
the full leakage case, all of the surplus goes to the promoter. 
6.4  Different Deadweights for Different Categories of Project 
Even though the reasoning here relies on rather abstract theory, there seems 
to be no better approach to the key problem of deadweight. It is certainly more 
acceptable than the naive assumption that the agencies capture all of the 
surplus. The parameters µ and λ have to be settled. They both lie between zero 
and one. Since there is no reason to think that the agencies or the government 
differ from large corporations in risk aversion, one-half seems appropriate for λ 
in that case. The more risk-averse the promoter, the lower her share of the 
surplus, so if one believed that small entrepreneurs were more risk averse (or 
more impatient) than the government, then one would have a lower value of λ, 
thus lower leakage and allowing higher grants.45 
 
45 The discussion is in terms of a simple negotiation in a zero-sum game. We neglect 
the complications that may be caused by the fact that negotiations on a grant involve 
additional correlated aspects, and may not be zero sum. 
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Figure A:   Grant level and jobs: base case
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Figure B:   Surplus when a uniform grant is changed
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Figure C:  Agencies claw back a fraction of surplus
x_ x' x"
Jobs
G
ra
nt
 le
ve
l
g"
g'
 DEADWEIGHT AND BARGAINING 33 
  
 Since about three in every four manufacturing start-ups are actually grant-
aided, it might seem difficult to argue for a very high value of µ (i.e., the 
fraction of employment that would exist if grant were zero). On the other hand, 
applying the elasticity of 0.55 (hardly valid over such a wide range) would give 
a value of µ at around 0.9 even if the ratio of grant to net-of-grant wages was as 
high as 20 per cent. Lower values of µ lead to lower leakage and thus allow 
higher grants. 
There may be a negative correlation between the value of λ and of the 
elasticity of labour demand proxied by µ. For example, low values of λ for 
small indigenous entrepreneurs may correspond to a relatively low grant-
sensitivity of their labour demand, and hence a low absolute value of µ. Ideally, 
we would have robust estimates of the labour demand elasticities for different 
categories of project (by size, ownership or product sector). This is not the case. 
In the absence of such information, and considering the supposed negative 
correlation between λ and µ, there could be an argument for not varying the 
deduced parameter θ as between different categories of project. 
It may be noted that this discussion of leakage and deadweight is very 
relevant to the question of which sectors should be eligible for grant-aid (and 
other preferential treatment). If a sector has a low labour demand elasticity, or 
if its inclusion would worsen the leakage parameter µ, then it should not be 
added to the existing list. 
The question of rescue and other forms of double-dipping must also be 
raised in this context. The threat of closure can be used by enterprises to lever a 
second round of grant-aid. There is a strong argument for dealing with firms 
that make such applications by applying a higher discount θ to the benefits. The 
reasoning here is that grants provided in a rescue situation are very prone to 
leakage, in the sense that conceding a rescue-type grant is likely to precipitate a 
number of “me too” claims. 
This chapter has presented a new approach to taking account of deadweight 
in discretionary grant schemes. We propose that a discount factor θ be applied 
to project benefits to ensure that the level of grants does not generate too much 
deadweight. The method points to the empirical quantities that are needed for 
implementation: the aggregate sensitivity of projects to grant-aid, and the 
relative bargaining strength of the grant agency and the entrepreneur. We show 
how this information can be appropriately combined to yield the deadweight 
factor θ used in the formula of Chapter 3. It is suggested that a reasonable value 
for θ for standard industrial grants in Ireland is about 0.8. The method is new, 
and the quantification acknowledgedly tentative, but it is offered at least as a 
more solid basis for thinking about these issues. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of a formal appraisal system is to rank projects, and to identify 
a cut-off point in the ranking. The approach adopted in this paper is that these 
decisions should be based primarily on factors which are reasonably 
measurable: employment and taxation flows. Both of these have been 
incorporated in previous appraisal systems, but we propose a significant change 
in the weights to be attached to them, basing our proposal on a deeper 
interpretation of Irish economic structure and of the internal logic of Irish 
economic policy. 
The importance of unemployment is recognised in our proposed 
calculation, but is tempered by a recognition that migration flows can 
substantially frustrate efforts to eliminate involuntary unemployment through 
job creation. Since it is unemployment reduction rather than job creation that 
contributes to the net socio-economic gains, that implies a much higher shadow 
wage than has been used in the past. 
The central role of tax and grant incentives in Irish industrial policy is also 
built in to our proposed formula, which both includes tax revenue indirectly 
clawed back from the project, and also takes account of the Government’s 
budget constraint and the economic cost of raising the needed revenue 
(marginal cost of social funds). 
Also provided is a new way of taking explicit account of deadweight, with 
the intention of ensuring that the grant regime is no more generous than needed 
to induce the investors’ response. 
In some ways, the approach suggested may seem old-fashioned, since it 
does not take account of positive externalities, clustering, increasing returns, 
dynamic learning effects and the like. Nor does it take account of negative 
externalities, such as the environmental and congestion side-effects that have 
become evident in recent years. That does not mean that we do not consider 
these to be important. But for the present, no generally accepted quantifiable 
framework exists for placing a value on such spin-offs. For that reason we have 
refrained from suggesting a formal procedure which would not command 
general acceptance, and whose inclusion would cast doubt on the whole 
procedure. 
Instead, we propose what will appear to be a much more rigorous approach 
to the appropriate quantification of the important elements of benefit that are 
included. 
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Together with a large number of more detailed revisions, the new approach 
has been tried out on a sample of actual projects. The results are encouraging. 
The new formula does make a difference, but it does not drastically reorder 
most projects. It can therefore credibly contribute to a worthwhile incremental 
policy change. 
The proposed appraisal method does not represent an overall evaluation of 
industrial development policy. That is not its intention: it is, as explained, 
intended as a tool of decision-making on a project-by-project basis. 
Nevertheless, there may be a tendency to assume that, if only projects with 
benefit-to-cost ratios in excess of one are funded, then industrial policy is 
optimal. This is not the case. 
Our discussion has highlighted important features of recent Irish economic 
policy: the central role played by the fight against unemployment; the 
widespread public awareness of the burden of taxation and the need to use 
public funds effectively; and the professional demands on public servants in 
dealing with the many foreign investors, balancing the desire to encourage their 
investment with the need to strike a good bargain.  
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ANNEX 1 
CHOOSING A NUMBER FOR THE IRISH SHADOW WAGE 
The Issue 
In deciding the shadow-price of labour, we need to balance simplicity with 
credibility. This is potentially an extremely complex area, and theoretical 
arguments could be provided for assessing shadow-wages separately for each 
major project. In practice we need a much more straightforward approach. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the shadow-price of labour which has hitherto 
been used is extremely low by international standards. On the other hand Irish 
unemployment is very high, and that might seem to justify a low shadow wage. 
For various reasons, including the relatively high labour mobility between 
Ireland and abroad, job creation in Ireland does not reduce unemployment one-
for-one. Our conclusion is that, despite high rates of unemployment, it is 
inadmissible to use as low a shadow-wage as has been used up to now. 
From this perspective, the crucial empirical quantity needed to determine 
the shadow wage rate is the sensitivity of unemployment to job creation. 
Basically the point is that if unemployment does not change (for example 
because as many migrants return as there are new jobs) then the conventional 
argument for lowering the shadow wage below the market wage, namely that 
some of the labour used was idle, fails. 
In our main approach, we use the results of macroeconometric models to 
estimate the reduction in unemployment resulting from expansion in industrial 
employment. Most models predict that such an effect would vary in the first 
years following the job creation, with a higher initial impact of job creation on 
unemployment being eroded by subsequent migration. But in the interests of 
simplicity it is recommended that this dynamic feature should be largely 
ignored for the purposes of shadow pricing. 
What we do is to compute the average reduction in unemployment over a 
seven-year period resulting from a sustained increase in industrial employment. 
As a refinement, future values are discounted at the rate of 5 per cent per 
annum before averaging in order to arrive at present values. 
Calculating the Response of Unemployment to Job Creation 
What reduction in unemployment can be expected to result from an 
expansion in industrial employment? In choosing a new figure, we recommend 
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reliance on the results of econometric analysis of unemployment dynamics, 
using sub-annual data. 
Several econometric models of the Irish economy allow calculation of the 
response of unemployment to job creation. They all predict that the initial 
impact of job creation on unemployment is fully eroded by subsequent 
migration. Indeed, the long-term effect on unemployment is predicted to be 
negative in simulations where the initial job creation has come from an 
expansion of government expenditure; while this feature might superficially 
appear to be perverse, it results from the subsequent increase in taxation which 
is needed to re-balance the fiscal accounts. Despite general agreement on these 
qualitative features, recent econometric work does not provide an unambiguous 
guide to the speed of the adjustment of unemployment to the initial shock. 
The reason for this ambiguity lies partly in the variety of model designs 
used, reflecting different approaches to the modelling of migration, and 
different degrees of complexity in the degree to which other relevant factors, 
such as taxation and wage determination, are taken into account explicitly. 
Another important distinction is between annual and quarterly models. There 
are more data series available at annual frequency, and this allows for a more 
elaborate modelling of the various linkage mechanisms in the economy. On the 
other hand, it is hard to capture the dynamic path of relatively quick responses 
in an analysis which is based on annual data only.  
Evidence from Quarterly Data 
The model in Honohan (1992) focuses directly on the link between Irish 
and UK unemployment,46 thereby avoiding the need to employ unreliable 
migration data. It uses the assumption that the long-term sensitivity of the 
unemployment rate to job creation in Ireland is zero (an assumption which is 
not contradicted by the data).That model predicts a gradual convergence of 
unemployment rates in Ireland back to their equilibrium relation with those in 
the UK. The quarterly data employed allows a fairly precise estimate of the 
speed of convergence. There is an estimated transition period of about two 
years following a shock, during which unemployment, having been disturbed to 
a level below the equilibrium, is still in the process of converging back. Using 
the estimated model (for males),47 and assuming that job creation had an initial 
one-for-one  effect  on  the level  of unemployment,  we calculated  the average  
 
 
 
 
46 Most of the analysis is based on registered male unemployment, adjusted for 
changes in data definition. 
47 Variations in registered female unemployment in recent years have not been as 
explained with the same degree of confidence. 
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impact on unemployment over thirty quarters. Taking account of time 
discounting, the result is that the reduction in unemployment averages only 
about 20 per cent of a sustained jump in the number of jobs.48 
Evidence from Annual Data  
Bradley, Whelan and Wright (1993), represents a recent version of the 
HERMIN econometric model of the macro-economy, based on annual data. Its 
approach is quite different, in that it assumes that migration flows (as opposed 
to the stock of unemployment) respond to relative employment conditions at 
home and abroad. Once migration gets under way, this model assumes that it 
will have its own momentum. As a result, it predicts a relatively slow build-up 
of migration which eventually leads to unemployment over-shooting its final 
equilibrium. The model shows unemployment approaching its ultimate 
equilibrium through an oscillating path. In a simulation carried out on the 
effects of a sustained jump in the level of public employment, this model 
predicts net immigration over seven years of 2.6 times the increase in public 
employment. Although this includes immigrants who are not labour force 
participants, it confirms that the unemployment impact of job creation is 
severely eroded by immigration. The simulation report does not calculate the 
unemployment impact directly. If two-thirds of the net immigration represent 
labour force participants, and even if there were no change in the labour force 
participation rate, the reduction in unemployment would again be no more than 
20 per cent of the overall job increase.49 
 
48 The exact number depends on the approximating assumptions made about the rate 
of job loss after creation (e.g., 0.10 per annum), the rate of discount (e.g., 0.05 per 
annum, Department of Finance, 1994), and the rate of convergence of unemployment 
rates (e.g., 0.2 per quarter, Honohan, 1992). If we know these parameters we can 
calculate the present value of the reduction in unemployment, and express it as a 
fraction of the present value of the increase in employment. One minus this fraction is 
then taken as the shadow wage, if the unemployed are assigned a zero opportunity cost. 
The indicated parameters yields a figure of 81 per cent; lower rates of job loss give 
higher figures. If we assume zero job loss and truncate the present value calculation at 
seven years, we obtain 79 per cent. (If the initial impact of job creation on 
unemployment is lower, then the percentage is higher.)  
49 To arrive at this estimate we used the estimated net migration resulting from the 
creation of 1000 public service jobs. We subtracted 67 per cent of cumulative net 
migration from the 1000 jobs to arrive at an estimate of the unemployment change. 
While unemployment was estimated to fall by 892 in the first year, this fell below zero 
after four years and, with continuing immigration, the unemployment impact was 
actually minus 642 persons after seven years. The net discounted sum of the 
unemployment effect over seven years comes to just 15 per cent of the jobs created. 
This ignores spin-off jobs resulting from the public service job creation (to be 
consistent with our proposed cost-benefit methodology, which treats such spin-offs 
separately).  
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The overshooting of migration predicted by this 1993 model has been 
regarded as an unrealistic and unsatisfactory feature. As a result of further 
econometric analysis, the migration equation has been revised in more recent 
versions of the HERMIN model (cf; Bradley, Whelan and Wright, 1995).For 
example, in one recent implementation (unpublished) the momentum in the 
migration equation (Koyck lag) has been removed. This means that the 
simulated speed of convergence is much slower. Indeed, in a special simulation 
carried out for this study,50 although the creation of 1000 permanent public 
sector jobs was projected to increase unemployment after 15 years, the early 
effects were favourable: reducing average unemployment over seven years by 
about 600. 
While the annual model of the whole economy thus agreed with the 
quarterly unemployment model as recently as 1993, the latest overhaul of the 
former model has inconveniently introduced an element of disagreement. There 
is scope for further analysis here, including use of the larger Medium Term 
Model. 
In applying the results of any annual model’s simulations to the effects of 
industrial employment creation, one must remain aware of the fact that the 
location and skill composition of public sector employment is quite different, 
and the unemployment response may also differ. Also, the migration data 
which it is designed to fit are generally considered unreliable. Finally, as 
mentioned, annual data is not the most suitable for capturing a response which 
is thought to be reasonably fast. 
Accordingly, our judgement is that primary reliance should be placed on 
the results of the quarterly model. 
Although it is clear that a considerable margin of error inevitably surrounds 
these estimates, they confirm that it is not possible to support shadow prices as 
low as 15 per cent. Even if the social cost of employing an unemployed person 
were zero, the estimated impact of job creation on unemployment from the 
male quarterly data would not justify shadow prices much below 80 per cent.51 
 
50 Thanks to John Bradley and Frank Barry for these special simulations and for 
helpful discussions. 
51 Even if the magnitude of the migration effect were not accepted, there are other 
factors pointing to a large shadow wage, including taking account of the utility of 
leisure. 
    
 40 
ANNEX 2 
A FORMAL MODEL OF DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION 
To ensure the logical consistency of the argument of Chapter 5, it is worth 
setting out a formal model, the simplest which captures the features which we 
seek to describe. 
Thus we assume that the economy is open, and that goods prices are fixed, 
and may thus be normalised at unity. There is a representative household 
maximising an utility function u(x,l), based on its consumption x and its labour 
supply l. The constraints faced by the household are that it can supply no more 
than a fixed ration of labour l* and must stay within its budget constraint: 
 
where w is the wage rate and a is lump-sum income (defined later).  
Writing, 
This defines the household optimum. 
Two sectors of private production exist, each producing output yi . Firms in 
each sector choose labour inputs li to maximise profits πi subject to that sector’s 
technology. Each sector’s labour input is taxed at a sector-specific rate πi .Thus 
profits for sector i are: 
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Profit maximising choices of yI   and lI  depend only on the technology and 
on πi and may be written: 
)(l=l
)(y=y
iii
iii
τ
τ  
Let the semi-elasticity of demand for labour with respect to the tax in each 
sector be written as ηi , i.e., 
     
  
 
 
The government uses the tax revenue from the tax on production inputs 
(these are the only taxes available) to purchase goods, and requires a total of T 
for essential public spending. Its budget constraint is: 
 
 . )(l+)(lT 222111 ττττ≤  (A.4) 
A fraction θi of firm i is owned by non-residents and this fraction of profits 
is repatriated abroad. The resource constraints (taking into account the fixed 
prices and open capital market which allows the goods to be treated as if they 
were perfect substitutes) are:  
The household’s lump sum income is that fraction of profits which are owned by 
the household: 
 
. )()-(1+)()-(1=a 222111 τπθτπθ  
 
If we write the indirect utility function of the household as V(a,l), then at 
the optimal (shadow) values of the tax rates, the Lagrangian L is at a stationary 
point with respect to the market adjustment variables a and l* and the policy 
variables τi , where 
 
 
)(l+)(ll*
)(-)(-T-y+yx
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222111211
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≤
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T]+)(+)(+)(y-)(y-l*)[x(a,-l*)V(a,=L
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22211122111
ττρττττρ
τπθτπθττρ
(A.6) 
with non-negative multipliers ρ. After some substitution, first order conditions 
give: 
In the case where all profits are domestically owned, the last of these simplifies 
to: 
 
. 1-1=1)+/)(-(
12
221 ηη
ρλττ  
 
In words, the difference in optimal tax rates is proportional to the difference 
between the reciprocal of the semi-elasticity of demand for labour in the two 
sectors. 
. 1-=
)+(
w)+(+)+(
=
-=
ii2
2i
3
1
ηλθρ
λµλρτ
µρ
λρ
    (A.7) 
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